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Reviews of Fiji, Papua New Guinea,
and Solomon Islands are not included
in this issue.
New Caledonia
The provincial elections in New Cale-
donia in May 2004 upset the political
status quo in this French overseas ter-
ritory, much as did the defeat of Gas-
ton Flosse, another ally of French
President Jacques Chirac, in French
Polynesia that same month. In New
Caledonia, Jacques Lafleur, whose
loyalist Rassemblement pour la Calé-
donie dans la République (rpcr) had
dominated the Congress (or Territor-
ial Assembly) for a quarter century,
suddenly found himself a minority
leader and resigned from his seat. The
new government, a coalition of for-
mer opposition parties and dissidents,
continued to pass “laws of the coun-
try” and to develop its economy as
the 1998 Noumea Accord empowered
it to do, but labor strikes, resistance
to a census that ignored ethnicity, 
and debates over local citizenship 
and identity symbols kept the “post-
colonial” era lively.
In April, the then-ruling rpcr cele-
brated its twenty-seventh anniversary
in the small settler town of La Foa
and launched its electoral campaign
with pleas for Lafleur not to resign
yet from political life, as he had
repeatedly vowed to do. Kanak Presi-
dent of the Congress and Senator to
Paris Simon Loueckhote begged,
“Jacques, please don’t leave the rpcr,
because there are women and men
here who trust you,” while Territorial
Government President Pierre Frogier
attacked rpcr dissidents who had
organized a rival movement called
Avenir Ensemble (ae, or “Future
Together”). The seventy-one-year-old
Lafleur, a wealthy businessman,
agreed to lead the party one more
time in the upcoming elections
because local supporters and Presi-
dent Chirac had asked him to.
“Independence has now become just
a word, a dream,” he observed,
adding that when the time came
between 2014 and 2019 for a possible
vote on independence, as provided for
in the Noumea Accord, “No one will
want to go to the referendum” (PIR,
21 April 2004).
According to the consensual agree-
ment reached in May 1998 by Paris,
the rpcr and the pro-independence
Front de Libération Nationale Kanak
et Socialiste (flnks), France would
continue to delegate self-governing
powers to the territory over the sec-
ond five-year mandate of the Noumea
Accord, such as control over the
police, internal air and maritime secu-
rity, secondary education, civil and
commercial law, land policy, and
budgetary and financial responsibility.
As a concession to the concept of
establishing a local citizenship for
deciding the future of the country,
rather than just allowing any French
citizen who arrives to cast a vote,
only those born in New Caledonia or
resident for at least ten years would
be able to vote in the provincial elec-
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tions. This rule, which was still being
examined by the European Court of
Justice, would eliminate about 10 per-
cent of the 130,000 potential voters.
A recent French law on gender parity
required that half the candidates on
each party list, in alternating order,
had to be women, and a party list
needed the support of at least 5 per-
cent of the registered voters in one of
the three provinces (North, South,
Islands) to obtain a seat in its assem-
bly. Then, by a complex proportional
method, 54 of the 76 total members
of the three provincial assemblies
could obtain a seat in the territorial
Congress, which in turn would elect
its own executive government (NC,
31 March 2004).
In the 1999 provincial elections,
twenty-three party lists had competed,
and the rpcr had emerged with 24
seats in the Congress. In coalition
with a dissident Kanak party, the
Fédération des Comités de Coordina-
tion Indépendantistes (fcci), it had
acquired a 28-seat voting majority
and 7 of the 11 seats in the govern-
ment executive, leading to complaints
about a lack of collegiality (consulta-
tion) in decision making despite the
proposal in the Noumea Accord to
work toward a “common destiny.”
Pro-independence parties won 19 con-
gressional seats in 1999 and only four
ministries, while two smaller loyalist
parties won 7 congressional seats and
no ministries. Loyalists dominated the
populous, wealthy Southern Province,
while Kanak nationalists controlled
the Northern and Islands Provinces,
perpetuating the de facto partition of
the country. In the May 2004 elec-
tions, thirty-one lists competed,
revealing growing divisions in the
broad coalitions of pro-French loyal-
ists and pro-independence indigenous
nationalists that had confronted each
other since the late 1970s. In the loy-
alist camp, the biggest change was the
emergence of the ae, a coalition of
Didier Leroux’s Alliance (which had
won three congressional seats in 1999
and was affiliated with the Union
Démocratique Français [udf] in
France) and other dissident loyalists,
led by Harold Martin, who had con-
tested Lafleur’s patrician leadership
within the rpcr but remained mem-
bers of Chirac’s Union pour une
Majorité Présidentielle (ump) in
France. The ae campaigned on a plat-
form of inclusiveness and consensus,
accusing the rpcr of failing to unite
the country and prepare for the trans-
fer of more self-governing powers.
The candidate at the top of its list,
Marie-Noëlle Thémereau, told Le
Monde, “A common destiny is built
by rallying people around symbolic
things. Symbols count in a society, 
but the rpcr is afraid of them” (Le
Monde, 6 May 2004). This vision of
centrist nation building attracted the
electoral support of Maréen High
Chief Nidoish Naisseline’s Libération
Kanak Socialiste party (lks). 
Meanwhile, the flnks continued to
be without a president after three
years because of internal division. Its
last president, Rock Wamytan, cam-
paigned with a list of his own called
“flnks for Independence.” His former
party, the Union Calédonienne (uc),
led by Charles Pidjot, was once the
leader of the flnks under Jean-Marie
Tjibaou. But since a secession by
seven uc congressional councilors in
2000, it has increasingly pursued its
own path as an independence party,
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accusing the flnks of not pushing
hard enough to enforce the Noumea
Accord. The remnants of the old
flnks are led by Palika (Parti de
Libération Kanak) and include the
small Union Progressiste Mélanési-
enne (upm) and the mostly Wallisian
Rassemblement Démocratique
Océanien (rdo). Together, they cam-
paigned as the “National Union for
Independence (uni) with the flnks,”
which received electoral support from
local progressive movements such as
labor unions and environmentalists.
The uni-flnks vowed to help “our
country emerge” in the second five-
year mandate of the Noumea Accord,
by promoting local citizenship,
favoring locals in hiring, controlling
immigration, creating local identity
symbols, promoting dialogue and col-
legiality, planning fair and balanced
economic development, improving
health care and housing, protecting
the environment, adapting and
expanding education, and promoting
the country’s role in the region. In
order to move toward full sover-
eignty, the uni-flnks sought to rally
all ethnic groups against the power
abuses of the old elite (the rpcr) and
transform that grassroots activism
into “a national sentiment.” It sought
to provide a more coherent strategy
that could overcome internal party
divisions caused by partisan interests
and personal ambitions (kol, 16–23
April 2004).
The elections on 9 May ended the
dominance of Lafleur’s party, as the
ae took away 9 seats from the rpcr
in the South, winning 19 total seats
out of 40 in the provincial assembly
and 16 seats in the Congress, com-
pared to 3 for the Alliance in 1999.
The rpcr dropped to 16 seats in the
provincial assembly and 16 in the
Congress (a loss of 8), while its for-
mer coalition partner, the fcci, lost
3 congressional seats and dropped to
one. The loyalist Front National (fn)
retained its 5 seats in the South and
its 4 congressional seats, while the
pro-independence parties did well in
the North (18 of 22 seats) and Islands
(12 of 14 seats) as usual, but failed to
win a single seat in the South and
dropped from 19 to 17 in the Con-
gress. Both Wamytan and Aloisio Sako
of the rdo blamed the complete fail-
ure of pro-independence parties in the
South, despite support from 10 per-
cent of the electorate there, on the
lack of unity within the flnks. Even
Guy George of the fn expressed con-
cern over the absence of a pro-inde-
pendence voice in the South. In the
North, uni continued to rule under
Paul Neaoutyine, gaining 3 seats for
a total of 11, while Pascal Naouna’s
uc gained one seat for a total of 7 but
was excluded from most leadership
positions. The fcci was eliminated
from representation, but the rpcr
won 3 seats and the ae one, thus
keeping the loyalist total of 4. In the
Islands, where the Kanak political
situation is very complex, 8 lists
competed for 14 seats in the assembly.
Women won half the seats, while the
uc, uni, lks, and fcci formed a
working majority of 10 seats (NC,
10 May, 3 June 2004).
The ae called the outcome a
“political earthquake,” and Lafleur
finally “retired,” resigning from his
seats in the South and in Congress
but remaining a deputy to the Paris
National Assembly. Martin, the for-
mer rpcr leader whom Lafleur had
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once tried to prevent from being
reelected mayor of Paita, won election
as president of the Congress on 21
May, with votes not only from the
ae but from the fn, lks, and uc
(NC, 2 June 2004). Another ex-rpcr
leader, the Algerian pied noir (French
settler) Mayor of La Foa, Philippe
Gomès, became president of the
Southern Province, promising an audit
after the outgoing regime had hastily
dispersed funds to client organizations
and removed documents and equip-
ment. In the new spirit of collegiality,
the ae and fn welcomed to the
assembly Christiane Gambey of the
pro-independence lks, who had actu-
ally run on the ae list. She is a Kanak
leader in the tourism business who
wants to improve coordination among
the three provinces and thus raise the
yearly visitor count beyond its ten-
year average of 100,000 (NC, 15 May
2004; PIR, 8 Sept 2004). In June, the
Congress met to decide on how many
ministries would be needed in the
government and chose eleven, the
maximum allowed by the Noumea
Accord’s organic laws and one more
than in the previous executive. The
four parties that held the required
minimum of six seats in the Congress
then presented lists of candidates for
ministers, which could include people
not elected to the Congress. Based on
their proportions of seats, uni (8
seats) would get two cabinet posts
and uc (7 seats) one, while the ae (21
seats, with help from the fn and lks)
and rpcr (17 seats, with the fcci’s
help) would likely get four posts each,
unless one of the loyalist parties was
able to lure a vote away from its rival
(NC, 5 June 2004). Either way, the
loyalists would dominate 8–3, as they
had in the previous regime, but per-
haps more collegially?
The first attempt to elect a govern-
ment failed on 10 June, when a new
rpcr councilor, Suzie Vigouroux,
marked her ballot “Frogier” (for the
former rpcr president of the govern-
ment) instead of putting down the
name of her party list. That invalid
ballot deprived the rpcr of a crucial
vote and hence a cabinet position, so
Frogier announced that his party
would collectively resign from the
executive, thus creating a procedural
crisis. The rpcr also claimed that
Vigouroux had been pressured by the
ae not to vote, whereupon the ae
filed a countersuit for defamation,
and the whole election process was
delayed. Thémereau had briefly won
election as president, because of the
ae’s temporary advantage of five
posts, and Déwé Gorodey of uni as
vice president, the same position she
had held in the previous government.
The fact that both were women was
quite a precedent (NC, 11 June 2004).
After some legal wrangling, the rpcr
regained its seventeenth congressional
vote and thereby its fourth cabinet
position. On 24 June, a new govern-
ment was elected, with four posts
each for the ae and rpcr, as origi-
nally predicted. But now the president
and vice president had to be elected
by an absolute majority of at least six,
and the uni and uc abstained, leav-
ing the two loyalist rivals in a dead-
lock after three attempted votes. The
cabinet then met with the French high
commissioner, who could call for fresh
elections if the impasse were not
resolved (NC, 25 June 2004; PIR,
24 June 2004). Martin, and Pierre
Maresca of the rpcr, even flew to
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Paris to assure Chirac that it was not
his party (the ump, which was affil-
iated with the rpcr) that had lost the
May elections but just the rpcr, since
many members of the ae were still
members of the ump, not the udf,
affiliated with Leroux’s Alliance (NC,
26 June 2004).
Finally, on 29 June, a negotiated
compromise enabled Thémereau and
Gorodey to be reelected as the govern-
ment’s highest executive officers. The
former received all 8 votes of the ae
and rpcr and the latter 9 votes—3
from the uni and uc, 2 from the
rpcr, and all 4 from the ae (NC, 30
June 2004). The responsibilities of the
individual ministers were assigned
according to their backgrounds, and,
Thémereau said, “in a completely
collegial way, in perfect harmony,
with no problem.” Gorodey, for
example, retained her portfolio for
culture, with the addition of women’s
affairs and citizenship, Frogier got his
favorite field, foreign affairs and trade,
businessman Leroux received direc-
tion over the economy and communi-
cations, and Charles Washetine, who
was not elected to Congress but has
long been Palika’s spokesman and is
an education specialist, received teach-
ing and research (NC, 3 July 2004).
This quasi-technocratic outlook
became more concrete during the year.
After a month in office, Thémereau
said that consensus and collegiality
prevailed on her team, especially
among the ae, uni, and uc, as they
got to know each other and worked
together toward greater cooperation,
transparency, and social justice. She
said that the economic outlook was
good in New Caledonia, but social
problems were worsening because of
lack of training for locals and insuffi-
cient attention to social welfare. The
pro-independence parties dissuaded
the government from keeping a cus-
tomary affairs ministry, to separate
Kanak custom from politics and
empower the Customary Senate to
deal with such matters (NC, 17 July
2004). 
The new government, unlike the
previous rpcr regime, focused on
better financing of urgent needs such
as fiscal reform of cafat, the public
insurance funding for health, mater-
nity, work accidents, unemployment,
and aging. Health costs were rising,
a new hospital was badly needed,
affordable housing was in desperately
short supply, family allowances
needed to be expanded to help the
most needy, infrastructure and edu-
cation had to be modernized, and
the social pact negotiated with labor
unions and employers had to be
implemented. Together, the ae, uc,
uni, fn, and lks passed new “laws 
of the country,” despite rpcr opposi-
tion, to raise taxes on large enter-
prises and lower them on small ones
and to raise the minimum wage. By
redirecting more revenues away from
future economic development to 
cover current social deficits, the ter-
ritorial budget reached one hundred
billion francs cfp (or about us$1.1
billion) in December (NC, 17 July, 6
Oct, 15 Dec, 16 Dec, 21 Dec 2004;
PIR, 24 Nov 2004). The European
Union agreed to provide New Cale-
donia with another us$26 million 
for professional training (PIR, 13 S
ept 2004), and the French National
Assembly allocated 1.7 billion euros
for social expenses in overseas territo-
ries, including 680 million euros for
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New Caledonia. But Frogier com-
plained that the motley new ruling
coalition in the territory was creating
instability by “building an artificial
unity on the exclusion of and distanc-
ing from France.” He called the
rpcr’s marginalization a udf plot
(NC, 15 Nov 2004).
In mid-June, the voters of New
Caledonia were again asked to cast
their ballots, this time for overseas
deputy to the European Union Parlia-
ment in Strasbourg. A current deputy
from Reunion, Margie Sudre, Viet-
namese-born and head of the ump
list, visited New Caledonia in late
May to remind voters that the Euro-
pean Union provided development
funding to the territory for education,
the environment, and mining. There
was also discussion of replacing the
French Pacific franc with the euro,
and in international affairs, she said,
“Europe has assured peace and stabil-
ity for fifty years.” The recent defeats
of ump lists in the elections in New
Caledonia, French Polynesia, and
Guadeloupe were “unjustified,” she
argued. They resulted from people’s
impatience to get quick results and
also a cut below the belt by the left:
“I have the feeling that French politics
is living through the hour of the
Kleenex generation. They take a
party, then throw it away when their
wishes are not immediately fulfilled”
(NC, 28 May 2004). Five New Cale-
donians ran for the three overseas
deputy posts, including Atelemo
Moleana of the rdo as a Socialist,
ecologist Didier Baron as a Green,
and Guy George of the fn, but with
only 7 percent of the total electorate
of overseas France, New Caledonia
had little clout. Despite the fact that
the European Fund for Development
was contributing us$670 million to
the territory in 2004, local turnout
in the European elections had been
declining every five years since its
high point of 37 percent in 1989 (NC,
7 June 2004). French Overseas Minis-
ter Brigitte Girardin pointed out that
since Britain had withdrawn from the
South Pacific Community (again),
France was the only representative 
of the region in Europe. “France is 
an Oceanian nation,” she claimed.
“Thanks to France, Europe is thus
present here” (NC, 9 June 2004). But
only 25 percent of Caledonian voters
participated in the European election,
compared to 77 percent in the provin-
cial elections the month before, and
populous and well-organized Reunion,
led by Sudre’s ump list, took all three
overseas seats (NC, 15 June 2004).
Jean-Pierre Pierard of the European
Commission Delegation lamented that
Europe was still “under-utilized” by
New Caledonia, which lacked the
“European reflex” (NC, 16 June
2004).
If the argument that France was
the conduit for European aid to the
Pacific did not carry much weight
among voters, the question of its role
as arbiter between the rpcr and
flnks in the follow-up process to the
Noumea Accord remained. In late
July, Neaoutyine traveled to Paris to
discuss five key matters with Girardin:
ensuring the full implementation of
the accord by holding another meet-
ing of the committee of signers, which
had last met in June 2003; revising
the French constitution to perma-
nently restrict the local electorate on
long-term issues to ten-year residents;
including ethnicity in the proposed
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population census in order to better
measure socioeconomic rebalancing
(rééquilibrage) as provided for in the
accord (which had formally recog-
nized Kanak identity); renewing the
annual economic development con-
tract between the Northern Province
and Paris before the end of the year;
and transferring the additional self-
governing powers as promised by the
accord. Martin of the ae had also
asked for a meeting of the accord
signers committee (NC, 22 July, 23
July 2004). Lafleur, however, would
not say whether the rpcr would par-
ticipate and disliked allowing the ae
to do so, claiming that it contained
no signers of the accord and that
many of its members had actually
voted against the accord. He also
warned that some in the new regime
risked a political crisis by not respect-
ing France enough: “Some are still
tempted to return to the independence
idea. I know it’s out of the question,
it’s impossible and that the first vic-
tims of those who wish for indepen-
dence would be the Melanesians”
(NC, 15 Sept 2004). In September,
President Thémereau met with
Girardin in Paris and discussed many
issues, including keeping the French
development money flowing and
holding a signers meeting in early
2005 (NC, 15 Sept 2004). A com-
promise would allow the ruling ae
to participate, because the flnks
and rpcr delegations could include
other parties (PIR, 12 Jan 2005). 
The rpcr, however, continued to
complain about misinformation
spread by the ae and attempts to
exclude short-term residents from
local citizenship. For example,
Maresca and other rpcr leaders
argued that, based on the audit in the
South and other indicators, adminis-
trative revenues were much healthier
than the ae claimed. Moreover, they
considered it unfair to limit territorial
political and economic benefits (eg,
hiring preference) to people who had
been resident for at least ten years,
calling it a politics of exclusion, “a
denial of equality . . . this drift
toward independence by means of a
chilly and villainous closing up of
New Caledonia on itself.” The rpcr
leaders admitted that they had previ-
ously spent more time before on gov-
erning than communicating, while the
ae was better at the latter, but now
that they were in opposition, they
would learn quickly and improve 
(NC, 18 Sept 2004). Because he felt
the ae coalition was not following 
the path toward a “common destiny,”
Lafleur changed his position on 
voting rights and citizenship in
November. Earlier, he had supported
a “sliding” citizenship of ten years
residence before each election, and
after the 2003 meeting of the accord
signers he said that he understood the
pro-independence parties’ preference
for a “frozen” electorate of voters res-
ident for ten years before the 1998
Noumea Accord. But now Lafleur
suddenly wanted to extend such rights
to people who had been resident for
at least three years, in order to avoid
creating two categories of French citi-
zens (and rpcr voters?) in New Cale-
donia (NC, 27 Nov 2004). In early
January 2005, the European Court 
of Human Rights finally decided that
limiting the provincial electorate to
ten-year residents did not violate the
right to vote, ending a six-year legal
campaign by the loyalist immigrant
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Mouvement pour la France (NC, 13
Jan 2005). 
The real complaint of the rpcr was
a reverse lack of collegiality, as the ae
could conduct business with the fn,
uc, uni, and lks even if the rpcr
objected. Lafleur told Le Figaro that
he saw the ae doing the bidding of the
pro-independence uc when it came to
the electorate issue, which in turn
affected employment and citizenship
(kol, 20 Nov 2004), and he warned
that the situation was just like 1984,
when political polarization had desta-
bilized New Caledonia (Les Infos, 3
Dec 2004). Meanwhile, the ae orga-
nized itself as a formal party, not
simply a voting coalition, and elected
Martin as its president. Leroux’s
Alliance and two smaller loyalist par-
ties agreed to dissolve and merge their
membership with the ae. Even Gam-
bey of the lks, who had run on the
ae electoral list and thereby attained
the lone pro-independence voice in
the Southern provincial assembly,
attended the founding congress of the
ae (NC, 31 Aug 2004, 2 Oct 2004).
Within the flnks, Palika had dis-
placed the uc as the controlling party
and systematically excluded the uc
from the Northern Province’s admin-
istrative councils, including those
devoted to the Koniambo nickel pro-
ject, while in the Congress the uc
often cooperated with the once-mar-
ginalized loyalists of the ae and fn.
Naouna of the uc countered Lafleur’s
complaint that his party was influenc-
ing the ae too much by saying that
after the first post–Noumea Accord
elections, the rpcr had formed a
coalition with the fcci, a party of
supposedly pro-independence Kanak
dissidents from the uc and Palika
(NC, 23 Oct 2004; Les Infos, 3 Dec
2004, kol, 23 Nov 2004). At its con-
gress in November, Palika reaffirmed
its goal of revolutionary socialist inde-
pendence for Kanaky, which it felt the
full implementation of the Accord of
Noumea would achieve, through
building a nickel-processing plant in
the North to balance that in the South
and thus provide needed jobs for
Kanak youth; freezing the electorate
and citizenship and favoring locals in
hiring; and using the flnks rubric in
ongoing follow-up negotiations with
Paris. Palika acknowledged that the
latter had slowed a bit because of the
shock the ae electoral victory had
caused to the rpcr and the French
ump, but the flnks would persevere
and prevail (kol, 17 Nov 2004). The
ae said that the lack of preparation
by the rpcr regime might delay the
transfer of more autonomy powers
until 2009, the very end of the second
accord mandate (Les Infos, 3 Dec
2004).
Another test of the new govern-
ment was the issue of whether to
inquire about ethnic and (for Kanak
inhabitants) tribal identities in a pop-
ulation census of the territory. Such
data had been collected in every New
Caledonian census since World War
II, but just before a scheduled survey
in July 2003, Chirac vetoed the idea
during his visit. At the Jean-Marie
Tjibaou Cultural Center, he had met
with young people, one of whom,
athlete Isabelle Artus, told him, “I
have lived in Caledonia since I was
two years old. I don’t feel Melanesian
or Zoreille (French metropolitan
immigrant). I feel Caledonian.”
Chirac was upset and called the
notion of checking off an ethnic
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identity on an official document
“scandalous” because it violated
French antidiscrimination laws. A year
later, the National Institute of Statis-
tics and Economic Studies prepared
to try again, with new questionnaires
that no longer included boxes for
ethnic or tribal identities. The pretext
given in 2003 for canceling the census
was that the New Caledonian govern-
ment had not been consulted. In 2004,
the government of the territory was
consulted on the change in the census
forms, but having changed leadership,
it now supported including ethnicity
and tribal identity in the inquiry.
Despite dissent from the pro-Chirac
rpcr, it said it needed to know the
ethnic composition of the population
in order to measure how successfully
the goal of socioeconomic rebalancing
was being achieved, and knowing the
tribal identity of the Melanesians
could determine urban migration
trends and funding for rural com-
munes—exactly the position of the
pro-independence parties (NC, 10 July,
23 July 2004). 
The flnks asked for a delay in the
census of several months to resolve
the impasse, arguing that the multi-
ethnic society of New Caledonia
needed the data that Chirac had pro-
hibited (NC, 25 Aug 2004). The uc
even threatened to boycott the census,
which was scheduled for August and
September, if ethnicity and tribal
identities were not included, calling
Chirac’s veto “a colonial act” because
it negated the Noumea Accord’s
recognition of Kanak identity and
the call for rebalancing. The pro-
independence labor federation Union
Syndicaliste des Travailleurs Kanak et
Exploités (ustke), led by Gerard
Jodar, seconded the boycott idea, but
Sylvain Pabouty of Palika supported
a solution whereby the local govern-
ment would conduct a second survey
in 2005 that would ask about ethnic-
ity and other social issues, and the
results of both would later be com-
bined (abc, 9 Aug 2004). The French
high commissioner agreed to the
compromise, but the uc refused to
vote with the ae for it, and Naisseline
of the lks called the second survey
“too expensive and precipitous.” The
ae had to turn to the fn and, ironi-
cally, the rpcr for the needed votes 
to finance the second survey, which
would cost an estimated us$1.5 mil-
lion (NC, 10 Sept 2004). By Decem-
ber, statisticians admitted that as
much as 10 percent of the population
had boycotted the census, not only
the uc or ustke but also an associa-
tion of metropolitan migrants who
felt they were being treated as second-
class citizens in New Caledonia and
therefore opposed the Noumea
Accord (PIR, 12 Dec 2004).
At the regional level, Thémereau
attended the annual Pacific Islands
Forum meeting in Apia, Sämoa, in
August, along with half a dozen other
government representatives, including
Neaoutyine. She expressed support
for the possibility that French Poly-
nesia, then under Oscar Temaru’s
more independence-oriented govern-
ment, might acquire observer status 
at the Forum as the flnks of New
Caledonia had. She also advocated
the prevention of terrorism or crimi-
nal activities, the promotion of sus-
tainable development, and improved
relations between the acp (African,
Caribbean, and Pacific) countries and
the European Union (NC, 9 Aug
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2004). Yet she was cautious about 
the idea of a free-trade zone in
Oceania, saying that the three 
French territories had a higher
domestic product than all fourteen
Anglophone states (excluding Aus-
tralia and New Zealand), and she
found it awkward that the flnks
and Temaru had such close ties, 
since she wants New Caledonia to
remain French (T-P, 8 Sept 2004). 
Four hundred regional scientists
met in Noumea in September to dis-
cuss issues and projects, an event that
Chirac had encouraged to “anchor
France in the Great Ocean of the
Anglo-Saxons, via the Caledonian
platform” (NC, 1 Sept 2004). He had
also said “France would like to con-
tribute to the stability and develop-
ment of the Pacific” by funding sci-
entific and health projects as well as
the media; Paris gave us$4 million to
such activities in the region (T-P, 12
Sept 2004). Meanwhile, a French
naval frigate patrolled Oceania’s mar-
itime economic zones for three
months in late 2004, in order “to
develop collaboration with small
South Pacific countries” (T-P, 20 July
2004), and the French military con-
ducted an emergency civilian evacua-
tion exercise in New Caledonia, in
case a crisis like that in the Ivory
Coast arose in the French Pacific (NC,
26 Nov 2004). Australian and New
Zealand forces had joined the French
in military exercises in New Caledo-
nia in June, as part of the 1993
franz agreement, and Thémereau
welcomed Australian overtures to
increase its already large trade with
and investments in the territory. Aus-
tralian exports to New Caledonia
total us$200 million annually, and it
is a major Australian tourist destina-
tion. Australian Foreign Minister
Alexander Downer said that Australia
supported the Noumea Accord and
“France’s constructive role in New
Caledonia and the region” (PIR, 21
Dec 2004). 
New Caledonian exports still con-
sist mainly of nickel, and the inter-
national price for it doubled in 2003,
due to the rising market in China and
India for stainless steel. The territory
hopes to increase its profit margin
further by tripling its production of
processed nickel, as opposed to raw
ore. Yet Kanak landowners and envi-
ronmentalists are voicing growing
concern over the impact of such strip
mining and chemically intensive
refining processes on the local soil,
waters, and reefs. Two years ago, they
tried to get New Caledonia’s barrier
reef (second in size only to Australia’s
and biologically one of the richest in
the world) classified as a unesco
World Heritage site, but the Chirac
regime stalled the effort, preferring to
entrust environmental protection to
the mining companies (PIR, 15 Jan,
16 Jan 2004; kol, 20 Feb 2004). The
long-established Société le Nickel
(sln), a subsidiary of Eramet, which
is majority French State-owned,
installed an additional furnace in its
Doniambo plant in Noumea, which
will increase its production of
processed nickel to 75,000 tons a
year. The sln also installed a new
filter that will decrease nickel dust
emissions by two-thirds. It expanded
its mining site at Tiegaghi, and the
harbor facilities nearby, in order to
provide Doniambo with a million
tons of ore per year (NC, 8 June,
6 July, 22 July, 13 Aug 2004). Mean-
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while, progress continued on the
us$1.6 billion joint venture between
the Northern Province and Falcon-
bridge of Canada to expand mining
at Koniambo and build a local pro-
cessing plant. A feasibility study was
encouraging, though Falconbridge
was still weighing costs of materials
(steel, fuel, etc) and the decline of the
dollar against the euro. The company
was already interviewing young job
applicants, and a final decision on the
project was due by the end of 2004.
Koniambo is expected to create nearly
900 jobs directly, and 2000 indirectly
in the region, which suffers from a 30
percent unemployment rate (NC, 3
Aug, 23 Sept 2004). If Falconbridge
does not say yes to the project by the
end of 2005, the sln will take it over
(NC, 9 Oct 2004). 
The most controversial nickel plant
is the us$1.8–2.0 billion project
planned for Goro, in the Southern
Province, by inco of Canada. In
2002, protests over environmental
issues and local hiring forced inco to
halt construction and reconsider the
arrangement. In June and July 2004,
inco held a series of public meetings
in New Caledonia, at the request of
the new government. Scott Hand,
president of the Canadian nickel giant,
said repeatedly that local inhabitants
support for the project was indispens-
able, since inco intended to be work-
ing in the territory for over a century
(PIR, 23 June 2004; NC, 29 July 2004).
Raphael Mapou’s Rheebu Nuu, a
local indigenous customary commit-
tee, still wanted inco to find a better
way to process the ore than using the
experimental pressure acid leach
method, but Southern Province Presi-
dent Gomès tried to sweeten the deal
by proposing that his province give
half the royalties to the Northern and
Islands Provinces, and that together
they acquire another 10 percent share
of Goro, in addition to the 10 percent
that the province and territory were
already going to receive. (This still
contrasts very unfavorably with the
51 percent ownership of Koniambo
by the North, but the three-province
agreement was finalized in January
2005 [NC, 15 Jan 2005]). Gomès 
also said that the new regime would
remain vigilant about environmental
impact, local hiring, participation by
local businesses, and sociocultural
impact on the inhabitants. Hand said
that inco still had its eyes on the
Prony site near Goro for future ore
supplies, though a court had taken
away its near-gratis permit for explor-
ing Prony in late 2003, only to have
then–Southern Province President
Lafleur restore it (NC, 31 July 2004;
kol, 20 Feb 2004). The new Southern
Province government approved the
Goro project in August, and in Octo-
ber inco gave it the green light and
soon began to hire people (NC, 13
Aug, 21 Oct, 30 Nov 2004). Hand
called it a model agreement, and the
presidents of all three provinces, the
government, and the Congress signed
it (NC, 22 Oct 2004). New Caledonia
also hosted a meeting of 200 nickel
experts from seven major countries
who eyed its huge reserves (PIR, 22
Sept 2004). 
World-class nickel mining and pro-
cessing has made New Caledonia the
most industrial country in Oceania,
but that situation has also created
powerful labor unions, who can para-
lyze the territory with strikes and play
a role in politics too. The fact that the
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Noumea Accord proposed favoring
local hiring and also rebalancing eco-
nomic relations between the indige-
nous Kanak and immigrants has
added fuel to strike actions, especially
as the current nickel boom attracts a
new wave of immigration. In the
provincial elections every party took
up the slogan of protecting local
employment, but no “law of the
country” has yet made specific how
long someone must be a resident to
avoid exclusion if a local citizen has
the same qualifications; each
employer uses its own hiring guide-
lines. The association of employers 
is studying whether they themselves
need to provide more training to
prospective employees in order to
satisfy the growing local demand 
for jobs, only one-third of which 
are provided by government. Several
strikes in the past two years by ustke
and the Union Syndicaliste des Ouvri-
ers et Employés de la Nouvelle-Calé-
donie (usoenc) have contested the
hiring of immigrants with only a 
year (or, in one case, eight years) of
residence instead of a local-born
applicant. For working in the terri-
tory, state civil servants on contract
from France receive extra pay that
almost doubles their salaries, which is
another source of resentment because
it adds to local inflation and shows
just how little the French State really
considers New Caledonia to be part
of France (the reverse does not apply
if a New Caledonian goes to France
to work). The locally funded cafat
provides unemployment insurance to
job-losers, but it is in the red finan-
cially, since 17 percent of workers
needed such help in 2003. That year,
10,000 people applied for 500 new
jobs every month (NC, 29 June, 6 July,
5 Oct 2004). 
On May Day, ustke marched in
political support of the oppressed
indigenous peoples of Palestine and
Iraq and in economic support of
generalizing family allowances to help
the needy, controlling immigration,
enacting fiscal (ie, tax) reform, and
protecting local employment, espe-
cially for Kanak, who comprise only
12 percent of the salaried workforce
(NC, 3 May 2004). In July, ustke
blocked the seaport for a week over
a dispute between two docker firms—
Manutrans (owned by Louis Kotra
Uregei, former ustke president, and
mostly Kanak) and Sofrana (owned
by Leroux)—over their respective
shares of ship unloading. After a
court ordered the police to reopen the
port by breaking up the picket lines,
ustke (a federation of a dozen unions)
called a general strike that lasted for
three days, shutting down everything
from gasoline to flour for bakeries to
animal feed to the international air-
port to the French television, radio,
and newspaper services. Even the
flnks tried to mediate to resolve the
strike. Leroux accused ustke of hold-
ing the whole country hostage over a
minor dispute and suggested it was
being manipulated by the rpcr to
embarrass the ae regime. But he
finally gave in and allowed Manu-
trans a greater share of harbor work,
though one of its own shipping line
customers had switched to Sofrana
(his firm), causing all the turmoil (NC,
27 July, 30 July, 2 Aug, 4 Aug, 5 Aug
2004). ustke soon shut down the
news services again, this time over a
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hiring dispute in which Rock Haocas,
a Kanak engineer from Lifou in the
Islands Province (where Uregei comes
from), claimed that after coming back
from training in France he had been
given a job beneath his qualifications
and experience at Radio France Over-
seas (rfo). Strikers blockaded the
broadcasting station, beating up a
cameraman who tried to photograph
them, so New Caledonia had no tele-
vision or newspaper service (except
online) for 100 days, until an agree-
ment granted Haocas a better job
(PIR, 7 Sept, 5 Nov 2004; NC, 2 Dec
2004).
An emerging “national” identity
thus expressed itself in various ways
in 2004, notably in the new spirit of
collegiality among the once-marginal-
ized non-rpcr parties in the Congress.
After a series of public discussions in
June and July about cultural symbols,
such as a new name for the country,
Jean-Paul Caillard suggested that the
increasingly used term Kanaky New
Caledonia (similar to Papua New
Guinea) might win by default,
because neither side of the old ethnic
divide was willing to abandon its
established label (kol, 17 July 2004).
In August, the Customary Senate
passed its presidency from Gabriel
Poadae of the Paicî region in the
North to Paul Jewine of Mare in the
Islands Province, and that same month
the families of Jean-Marie Tjibaou,
Yeiwéné Yeiwéné, Djubelly Wéa, and
Daniel Fisdiepas completed a long
customary process of reconciliation
for the tragic events of May 1989,
when Wéa assassinated the first two,
and bodyguard Fisdiepas killed Wéa
(NC, 23 Aug, 29 Dec 2004). On 24
September, the Mwâ Kâ, a Kanak
totem pole carved with images from
all eight Kanak cultural regions that
had been created for the 150th
anniversary of French annexation in
2003 as a symbol of ethnic recon-
ciliation, was installed permanently
in front of the National Museum.
Lafleur had appropriated the Mwâ
Kâ, when the rpcr mayor of Noumea
had banned it from the Place des
Cocotiers in the center of the capital,
and later asked to have it removed
from the grounds of the Southern
Province headquarters. This year,
Gomès and Leroux hailed it as a
reminder that Noumea was not only
a white city and that everyone should
remember that New Caledonia is part
of Melanesia. It was also the thirtieth
anniversary of the first protest, in
1974, by Kanak and Caledonian radi-
cals against settler celebrations of
annexation, a fitting date for a new
beginning (NC, 24 Sept 2004; kol,
24 Feb 2004; Maclellan 2005). 
david chappell
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Papua
Again this year, the indecisive policies
of Jakarta were met with disillusion-
ment in Papua, albeit amid hopes of
change after President Megawati
Sukarnoputri was ousted in the
national parliamentary elections.
Before a devastating tsunami hit
coastal stretches of Asia and South-
east Asia including the province of
Aceh and west-coastal stretches of
North Sumatra on 26 December
2004, the year in Indonesia looked
likely to be remembered as one in
which a major step was made toward
the consolidation of democracy. Elec-
tions held in April, July, and Septem-
ber resulted in a new parliament and
new regional legislators. Susilo Bam-
bang Yudhoyono (popularly know
as sby), a former army general,
defeated Sukarnoputri on charisma,
a purported no-nonsense approach
to stagnating reform and growing
corruption, and the promise to peace-
fully resolve the tensions in Papua
and Aceh.
Fear that concessions to Papua
would encourage separatists remained
widespread among officials in the
central government. On 5 January, the
Indonesian Army chief of staff, Gen-
eral Ryamizard Ryacudu, reminded
the nation that it might lose Papua
and Aceh because of threats from
“modern warfare.” He suggested that
rampant human rights allegations
made by foreign parties against the
military were part of a conspiracy 
to separate the provinces. Ryacudu
claimed that the conspirators had
enlisted several nongovernmental
organizations to meet their goals, 
not least the United Nations. 
Out of fear that Papua might
become a second East Timor, the
majority of Indonesian policymakers
continued to respond ambiguously to
demands for justice and equal sharing
from Papua. Support continued for
weakening institutions that could
foster Papuan nationalism, and new
ill-prepared provincial and district
governments were allowed to assume
responsibility over large amounts of
funds and to face the huge challenges
associated with bringing services and
enhanced economic and educational
opportunities to the people. While
most Papuan leaders demanded
recognition of the myriad problems
faced by the people, certain parties
in Jakarta as well as elements of the
Papuan elite continued to support the
establishment of the province of West
Irian Jaya. In an atmosphere of con-
fusion and distrust of the central
government, the people of Papua
embraced the possibility of casting
votes for political change. 
The first polling took place on 5
April and led to the election of mem-
bers for a 550-seat parliament, the
council of regional representatives,
provincial legislatures, and regent/
municipal legislatures. Overall, the
election reflected clear nationwide
aspirations for a democratic solution
to feelings of marginalization and
grievance over the poor delivery of
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services. Unlike during the national
election in June 1999, no boycotts, no
demonstrations, and no major frauds
occurred. Violent conflict in areas of
Papua renowned for ethnic discord,
such as Mimika, Wamena, and
Sorong, did not eventuate. Well before
the election, the Provincial Elections
Commission in Jayapura became
worried about shortage of funds to
finance the complicated logistics. In
early March, the governor of Papua
indicated that of twenty regencies in
the province (excluding West Irian
Jaya), nine had not yet received any
materials for the legislative elections.
The General Elections Committee in
Jakarta responded that they had
asked the National Military Forces
(tni) to help distribute the materials
in the case of an emergency. How-
ever, a few days after the elections,
the highlands district of Pegunungan
Bintang and the subdistrict of Okaba
(Merauke) reported that they had yet
to hold polls due to the late arrival of
election materials from the General
Elections Committee. 
During the months preceding
the April polls, tensions developed
between the provincial administration
and the elections committee. The fric-
tion had to do with the lingering con-
troversy over the division of the prov-
ince. Papuan bureaucrats accused the
committee of being contaminated by
government interests, as the new prov-
ince was not mentioned in the Election
Law while West Irian Jaya’s acting
governor, Abraham Atururi, had
required all legislative candidates to
accept the new province’s existence.
In mid-January, Bambang Widjo-
yanto, the head of the Papua Special
Autonomy Defence Team that filed a
law suit against the division of the
province, stated that Law No. 45/1999
for that division was orchestrated by
the Sukarnoputri-led Indonesian
Democratic Party of Struggle (pdi-p)
to weaken the dominant Golkar Party
in the region. He suggested that the
pdi-p had economic interests in Bin-
tuni Bay where British Petroleum and
Pertamina are establishing the Tang-
guh natural gas plant. Widjoyanto
added that both the military and the
National Intelligence Agency (bin)
would also lose out if the law were
dropped because the two institutions
have economic interests in maintain-
ing a high level of tni presence in the
region. Furthermore, Widjoyanto sent
two warnings to the General Elections
Committee to annul its decision on
the establishment of West Irian Jaya
electoral districts. Speaking on behalf
of the Speaker of the Papua Provincial
Legislative Council, John Ibo, he said
that his legal team also objected to
the seat allocation for the West Irian
Jaya Provincial Legislative Council
and Regencies Legislative Council.
The allotted 44 seats to the new
province exceeded the 35 that would
legally be allocated for the population
of 567,894 recorded in the latest
census. 
On 5 July, people voted for presi-
dent and vice president for the first
time ever. These elections proceeded
without major disturbances through-
out the archipelago and selected two
presidential candidates out of five. In
Papua, voter turnout was high again
with fervent complaints in those
regions where ballot boxes did not
arrive in time or where the voting
forms were not in order. One of the
main reasons for the widespread par-
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ticipation in the elections was the dis-
appointment felt by many toward the
ineffectual Sukarnoputri government.
Disillusionment grew when people
saw President Sukarnoputri’s lack of
commitment to Papua, reminding
them that they live in a part of Indo-
nesia not likely to receive just gover-
nance if business and military inter-
ests in Jakarta prevail. Since sby
(Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono) advo-
cated support for Special Autonomy
(commonly referred to as Otsus) and
promised to foster democracy, most
considered a future under him as
more promising. The final round of
the presidential elections ended in a
victory for sby and his vice presiden-
tial candidate, Jusuf Kalla, who
received 61 percent of the votes. In
Papua, sby defeated Megawati Sukar-
noputri with 67 percent of the votes
compared to 33 percent, while in
West Irian Jaya sby received 58
percent of the votes. 
The nation’s composure during the
long electoral season came as a sur-
prise to observers who had forecast
violence. In some out-of-the-way
regions of Papua, incompetence, poor
logistics, and a shortage of funding
delayed delivery of often-inaccurate
voter-identification cards, thus ham-
pering the elections. This further
alienated people from the political
process. Political apathy, caused by
the commonly held perception that it
does not make much difference who
gets elected in an intrinsically corrupt
system, and a gradual loss of hope in
reformasi (the movement for demo-
cratic reform) may have caused the
elections to proceed without disrup-
tion. However, high voter turnout
clearly demonstrated the general sup-
port for civilian-led government and
democratic rule in Indonesia. 
On 6 February, an earthquake
measuring 6.9 on the Richter scale
damaged buildings, houses, and
infrastructure in Nabire, with out-
lying areas also severely affected.
Thirty-seven people died, hundreds
were injured, and thousands were
forced to seek shelter. A second major
quake registering 7.1 struck close to
the city the next day and aftershocks
were felt until mid-February. Minister
of Welfare Jusuf Kalla visited the
region and promised us$178,000
for relief and reconstruction work,
and the United Nations launched 
an aid effort. Amounts ranging from
us$50,000–170,000 were donated by
a number of foreign governments and
international aid organizations. How-
ever, aid was slowly provided, poorly
distributed, and limited in amount. 
As part of her election campaign,
President Sukarnoputri visited the
victims a month later, promising
houses, schools, and hospitals. 
One and a half weeks after the first
major earthquake, reports about out-
breaks of dysentery and a surge in
malarial infections emerged from the
region. Over 2,000 people, mostly
traders and shopkeepers, left the
region to assume life elsewhere in
Papua or returned to South Sulawesi.
On 26 November, the region was hit
by another quake that measured 6.4
on the Richter scale and a long series
of aftershocks. Over thirty people
were killed and again significant
material damage was caused, largely
in and around the town of Nabire.
Two weeks later, health workers
sounded the alarm over the need for
more medical supplies to deal with
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disease outbreaks. Jusuf Kalla visited
the stricken region again but this time
in the capacity of vice president. On
30 November he handed over a
cheque worth us$110,000 to Nabire
Regent A P Youw in a ceremony that
was witnessed by Papua Governor
Jaap Solossa, and asked that the
money be used wisely to meet the
needs of the victims. President sby
spent a night with the victims in a
tent during his Christmas tour of
Papua. 
The visits of officials from the
central government to Nabire were
laudable developments, but critics
quickly pointed out that the govern-
ment should also deal with issues that
are equally or more pressing. Besides
rampant illegal logging, illegal fishing,
and a growing spread of hiv/aids
throughout the region, ongoing
counterinsurgency by the tni and
the police in the highlands lead to
numerous deaths. Thousands of
refugees and many others lived in
fear. 
The rampant spread of hiv/aids
is partly connected to the tni involve-
ment in resource exploitation, in
particular illegal logging and gaharu
(eaglewood) gathering, as well as
trade in remote places. Prostitution
centers established and run by the 
tni to service local and migrant
workers is a principal source of
infection. Estimates suggest that the
number of hiv-infected people in
Papua stands at approximately
15,000 at present. Meanwhile, the
Indonesian media reported in mid-
August that the tni has deployed an
additional 1,800 troops to Papua,
allegedly to address difficulties with
Papua New Guinea villagers who
have made traditional claims along
the largely undemarcated and
unpatrolled border.
In November 2003, Kopassus (tni
Special Forces) killed ten people while
they slept in Yalengga village, in the
Jayawijaya district. The night before
he was killed, Yustinus Murib, local
leader of the Free Papua Movement
(opm), broadcast a message of peace
and reconciliation on Australian tele-
vision in which he called for UN
intervention and peaceful dialogue
between Jakarta and Papua. A pub-
lished photo of soldiers displaying
Murib’s dead body like a game 
trophy sparked heated criticism of 
the military’s brutality. The attack on
Yalengga was part of a tni offensive
in the highlands that led to the burn-
ing of villages and displaced thou-
sands. The campaign entailed extra-
judicial killings, torture, rape, and
assaults on health clinics, churches,
schools, and gardens. Compounding
the suffering of the civilians, the tni
has prevented humanitarian assistance
workers, including Papuan church
leaders, from accessing these areas,
thereby preventing the supply of food
and medicine to hundreds of villagers
still hiding in the forests. Church
leaders report that scores have died
of starvation and disease as a con-
sequence.
In mid-October, Kopassus and 
the Police Mobile Brigade (Brimob)
launched a series of inept operations
in and around Mulia, in the Puncak
Jaya district, apparently in retaliation
to an attack on non-Papuan workers
on the Trans Wamena road on 12
October. The perpetrators may have
been disgruntled Papuan workers but
the military quickly pointed at opm
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leader Goliat Tabuni. On 21 October,
bullets fired from a tni helicopter
killed a priest and a number of other
people. Scared by the air assault,
hundreds of people sought refuge in
the mountains. In response to the
incident two members of the council
of regional representatives, Ferdi-
nanda Ibo Yatipae and Protestant
minister Max Demetouw, called on
President sby to do all he could to
prevent such undisciplined and
unnecessary military operations in 
the region. Outraged by the events,
they also asked the government to
take responsibility for the growing
amount of refugees in the region.
Furthermore, they demanded a clear
focus in policies, including a well-
thought-out plan for dealing with the
opm that would not include the ter-
rorizing of innocent people, and the
immediate implementation of Otsus
as promised by sby and Jusuf Kalla
during the election campaign. 
The terror campaign also forced
most Baptist churches in the region 
to close, and Pastor Elisa Tabuni was
killed by Kopassus during interroga-
tions regarding the whereabouts of
Goliat Tabuni. President of the Fel-
lowship of Baptist Churches in 
Papua, Socrates Yoman, noted that
local people are suspicious that the
culprits in the killings were not those
serving under Tabuni but rather were
from one of two local militia groups
organized by the tni. Also, according
to Yoman, the tni had demanded
substantial financial support from
local officials to underwrite the mili-
tary operation. In the course of the
military operation, the national and
international media began to specu-
late that the atrocities were organized
to forestall a promise by President
sby to peaceably resolve tensions 
in both Papua and Aceh within the
first one hundred days of the new
administration. Such a reduction of
tensions in Papua would undermine
the security pretext for the tni’s
lucrative deployment in Papua.
Fearing too much attention to the
operations in the highlands, the 
police refused to permit a major
gathering of three Papuan religious
organizations. 
On 25 November, the provincial
authorities issued a warning to people
not to raise Papua’s Morning Star 
flag or gather to commemorate the
1 December anniversary. Despite the
warning, the flag was hoisted at a
number of locations, including the
Trikora field in Abepura, where,
reportedly, around two hundred peo-
ple gathered. After the flag flew at
Trikora for about one hour, the police
demanded that it be lowered. The
police forcefully seized the flagpole
but it was quickly seized back by the
group of demonstrators. Police then
fired warning shots and unsuccessfully
tried to disperse the group. Outnum-
bered, the police retreated, resulting
in a one-hour standoff during which
the flag continued to fly. When dozens
of police reinforcements arrived at the
scene, the demonstrators retreated. 
A number of people were arrested,
including Filep Karma and Yusak
Pakage, who have since then been
indicted for rebellion against the 
state. They face penalties up to life
sentences.
Toward the end of July, activists
all over Indonesia, including Papua,
began to criticize a revised bill con-
cerning the tni. They argued that the
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amended law represented a setback
for democracy because, if enacted, it
would retain the military’s territorial
presence. The late Munir of the
National Commission on Missing
Persons and Victims of Violence
(Kontras) said the bill scrapped presi-
dential authority to approve deploy-
ment for other purposes, including
territorial security. He said Article
8(2) of the bill contradicted the Peo-
ple’s Consultative Assembly Decrees
on the separation and different duties
of the police and the tni. The article
states that the tni had three key roles
in maintaining state sovereignty and
integrity: to launch war against the
enemy, to launch military operations
other than war, and to maintain terri-
torial supervision. He also criticized
the proposed Article 59, which
reaffirmed the existence of the military
court authorized to grant impunity to
its soldiers. After extensive rephrasing
and deliberation, the preservation of
the tni’s territorial role was approved
on 30 September by the House of
Representatives, shortly before the
end of their mandate.
After much delay, the trials of the
senior police officers accused of crimes
against humanity committed in Abe-
pura in December 2000 began in the
newly established Permanent Human
Rights Court in Makassar, South
Sulawesi, on 1 April. Brigadier Gen-
eral Johny Wainal Usman and former
Municipal Police chief (and still head
of the Papua Police Information
Office) Adjutant Senior Commander
Daud Sihombing are accused of the
murder, arbitrary detention, and tor-
ture of Papuan students following an
attack on the local police station.
After the attack, the Abepura Police,
assisted by the Jayapura Brimob,
began a hunt for the perpetrators 
by scouring nearby residential areas,
including a student residence. During
the searches, police arrested and
assaulted over one hundred people,
and three were tortured to death. At
the trial Sihombing chose to read his
own defense, titled “Don’t be misled
with the deception of the traitors of
the state in such a way that an inno-
cent patriot was trapped with a scarf
of his motherland to which he has put
his life.” During the legal proceedings,
on 7 June, the panel of judges dis-
missed a class-action claim of com-
pensation by the victims of the fami-
lies, who have received no redress
from the government. The judges
argued that within the framework of
Law No. 26/2000 on human rights
violations there is no mechanism for 
a class-action claim, while in fact
Article 35 of the law states such pro-
cedures. The trial of the two suspects
is continuing. 
Uncertainty continued to surround
the 31 August 2002 ambush on Free-
port’s mining road in which three
schoolteachers (two of whom were
US citizens) were killed. From the
outset of the investigations, the tni
have tried to overrule initial conclu-
sions drawn by the police and human
rights organizations, which implicated
the involvement of Indonesian troops.
One of the survivors, Patsy Spier,
whose husband was killed in the
attack, continued lobbying the US
Congress to adhere to the ban on
International Military Education and
Training (imet) and weapons sales to
Indonesia. Since 2003 the fbi has
attempted to investigate the 2002
ambush, but with little success. The
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Consolidated Appropriations Bill for
fiscal year 2004 bans imet until the
US State Department determines that
the tni and government are cooperat-
ing with the fbi investigation and a
range of conditions are met, includ-
ing extradition of those indicted by
the joint UN–East Timor Serious
Crimes Unit, a public audit of tni
funds, and prosecution of tni mem-
bers who have been credibly alleged
to have committed gross violations
of human rights.
US Attorney General John Ash-
croft’s labeling of Anthon Wamang 
as a “terrorist” and the suggestion
that he was acting as a member of 
the Free Papua Movement (opm)
when his group carried out the attack
at Freeport had immense ramifica-
tions. It provided the Indonesian mili-
tary with carte blanche to pursue
Papuan dissidents. In early August,
elsham, lemasa, and yahamak (the
human rights groups in West Papua
that assisted the fbi in its investiga-
tion of the killing of two Americans
at the Freeport mine in August 2002)
expressed their grave concerns over
Ashcroft’s actions, and called for the
US Congress to facilitate a full and
impartial investigation. Although it
is still not clear exactly who was the
overall mastermind of this attack, an
unprejudiced reading of the facts
points as much to the military as to
the opm. Though identified as an
opm field commander, Anthon in fact
lived in the city of Timika where he
was a business partner of Kopassus.
Anthon told the three human rights
organizations as well as fbi agents
that he was in the gaharu (eaglewood)
and gold business with Kopassus.
Though Anthon had been in the field
at various times with the opm over
the past two decades, at the time of
the attack he was living and working
alongside Kopassus, not the opm. 
The freedom of movement of civil
society organizations remained diffi-
cult. In April, tni sued the human
rights organization elsham in rela-
tion to its public release of the results
of an investigation into the August
2002 ambush at the Freeport mine.
The judge presiding over the us$5.5
million libel suit refused requests by
the elsham defense team to recall
witness Decky Murib to the stand on
April 14. Under pressure of the mili-
tary, a month earlier, when military
prosecutors brought Murib to the
stand as a witness, he changed his
testimony and alleged that elsham
investigators coerced him into giving
false information about military
involvement in the attack. The Indo-
nesian military commander in Papua,
Major General Nurdin Zainal, called
it a victory for the tni, but the media
reiterated that Murib had worked as
an informer for Kopassus personnel in
the Freeport mining area for a num-
ber of years. 
In March, the Constitutional Court
began to review Law No. 45/1999 on
the formation of West and Central
Irian Jaya and a number of new regen-
cies. Governor Solossa and Legislative
Council Chairman John Ibo, assisted
by the Papua Special Autonomy
Defence Team, filed the request for
the judicial review. Testifying before
the court on 17 March, Bishop Leo
Laba Ladjar of Jayapura warned that
if the government was reluctant to
implement Otsus for Papua, intellec-
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tuals and bureaucrats might join the
people to form a freedom movement.
On 11 November, the court judge
ruled that the establishment of West
Irian Jaya remained valid although
Law No. 45/1999 was no longer effec-
tive. Eight of the nine judges argued
that the Otsus Law took effect after
the new province and regencies were
formed, and that no state institution
had been annulled by the law. The
court ruling was seen as a victory for
West Irian Jaya’s acting governor,
Abraham Atururi, and left many con-
fused in Jayapura, Sorong, and else-
where in Papua. For West Irian Jaya,
the verdict requires a review of the
province’s status, specifically the
application of Otsus. If Otsus is to
be applied to West Irian Jaya, it will
have to be mandated by a special
autonomy law, which can only be
passed after deliberation by the yet-
to-be-established Papuan People’s
Assembly (mrp). While the media
reported the decision as a win–win
solution for all conflicting parties in
Papua and Jakarta, John Ibo noted
that it will lead to increasing chaos
and growing loss of confidence in
Jakarta’s commitment to the 
problems in Papua. 
During a meeting with Governor
Solossa in early November, President
sby ordered the immediate establish-
ment of the long-awaited mrp as
required by the Otsus law for Papua,
but underlined that the council would
simply be a cultural representative
rather than a political body. Clearly
advised by security and intelligence,
he criticized the conception of the
mrp as a “super body,” saying it
could threaten the integrity of the
nation. Instead, the revised mrp will
represent religious, customary, and
female groups, without having any
political rights. During an interview
with the Jakarta Post, Solossa pointed
out that what is special about the
autonomy for Papua is the mrp,
which according to the underlying
law is the highest decision-making
institution, representing all constit-
uencies in the province. sby also
promised to set up a Papua desk at
the presidential office to deal with
matters related to Papua. During the
meeting, Solossa invited the president
to attend Christmas celebrations in
Papua. 
During his visit to Papua over
Christmas, sby tried to make up for
the previous lack of commitment to
Otsus in Papua with a “Christmas
gift” comprising the establishment of
the mrp. After sby’s visit, the news
that spread about the imminent estab-
lishment of the mrp revived the dis-
cussion about whether Otsus is, as the
popular rhetoric goes, for the people
of Papua, or for “Indonesia” and
those Papuans in the administration
whose minds have become “Indone-
sian.” The general suspicion is that
Otsus is yet another promise of
Jakarta to placate the people of 
Papua with some hollow policy that 
is not going to better Papua but
instead divide its people even further.
Frustrated with a protracted history
of deferred promises and failing 
development programs, most people
in Papua are suspicious of the pur-
pose of Otsus and Jakarta politics.
Successful elections, a new promising
president, and the approval of mrp
should augur well for the people of
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Papua. However, this year the reality




Cenderawasih Pos. Daily. Jayapura.
Down to Earth. Monthly. London.
Far Eastern Economic Review. Weekly.
Hong Kong.
Jakarta Post. Daily. Jakarta.
Kabar-Irian. Daily bilingual news service.
<http://www.kabar-irian.com>
Kompas. Daily. Jakarta.
New York Times. Daily. New York.
NRC Handelsblad. Daily. Rotterdam.
Suara Pembaruan. Daily. Jakarta.
Sydney Morning Herald. Daily. Sydney.
TAPOL Bulletin. Monthly. London.
Washington Post. Daily. Washington.
West Papua Reports. Monthly. Robert F
Kennedy Memorial Centre for Human
Rights.
Office for Justice and Peace. 2004a. Papua
Aktual, Seri Catatan Sosio-Politik, Papua
Aktual 7 ( Jan–March), 8 (April–June),
and 9 ( July–Sept). Office for Justice and
Peace, Diocese of Jayapura.
———. 2004b. Bisnis Gaharu dan
Dampaknya Terhadap Kehidupan Orang
Awyu dan Wiayagar Di Distrik Assue,
Kab. Mappi–Papua Selatan, November.
Office for Justice and Peace, Diocese of
Jayapura.
Vanuatu
National politics in Vanuatu in 2004
were again dominated by personalities
rather than policies, with a number 
of changes of government throughout
the year as personal alliances shifted.
In November 2003 there had been a
change of government, from a coali-
tion between the Vanua‘aku Pati (vp)
and the United Moderate Party 
(ump) to a coalition between vp, the
National United Party (nup), and the
Alliance for the Development of Van-
uatu (adv)—which was itself a coali-
tion made up of the Green Party, the
Vanuatu Republic Party (vrp), and
others. Then Prime Minister Edward
Natapei had instigated the change in
coalition to avoid a vote of no confi-
dence, although as 2003 drew to a
close, rumors of such a vote showed
little sign of abating. 
Early in the New Year, a reconcili-
ation ceremony between nup, ump,
and the Melanesian Progressive Party
(mpp) was held (VDP, 3 Jan 2004).
This strengthened rumors of a no-
confidence motion, as a coalition of
these three parties would have had
sufficient numbers to carry such a
motion. By the middle of January,
Natapei was denying a counter-rumor
that he was considering a further
cabinet reshuffle in order to avoid a
no-confidence motion (VDP, 15 Jan
2004). The fragility of the government
became even more apparent when the
adv threatened to withdraw support
from Natapei unless adv members
were given more portfolios and more
places on various statutory boards
(VDP, 24 Jan 2004). The prime minis-
ter’s office initially refused to bow to
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the pressure, saying that the demands
of the adv were not in accordance
with the memorandum of under-
standing that had led to the change
of coalition in November 2003. How-
ever, on 19 February—two days after
adv had presented Natapei with an
ultimatum to reshuffle the cabinet or
face a vote of no confidence—the
cabinet reshuffle went ahead (VDP,
20 Feb 2004).
In the reshuffle, adv President
Maxime Carlot Korman replaced
Sato Kilman of the Peoples Progressive
Party (ppp) as minister of agriculture,
forestry, and fisheries. In addition Joe
Natuman (vp) lost his position as
minister of internal affairs to George
Wells, another vp member; and Jack-
leen Reuben Titek (vp) lost his posi-
tion as minister of lands to John
Morsen Willie (also vp). Donald Kal-
pokas immediately resigned his posi-
tion as minister of education in pro-
test over the reshuffle (VDP, 21 Feb
2004). Minister for Finance Sela
Molisa followed Kalpokas in resign-
ing a fortnight later (VDP, 9 March
2004). These changes within the cabi-
net provided public confirmation of
divisions within the vp leadership that
had been simmering for some time. 
Divisions within vp became more
apparent at the vp congress held at
Lingarak in October 2003. Voting on
the vp executive split the party. On
one side was the “old guard,” which
included Molisa, Kalpokas, Natuman,
and Titek. On the other were the sup-
porters of Edward Natapei. At the
Lingarak congress, a motion to oust
the old executive was passed, but vp
Honorary President Kalpokas then
declared the vote invalid due to irreg-
ularities. This matter could not be
resolved at Lingarak so tensions
between the factions continued, and
vp was left without a clear executive.
Kalpokas claimed the tensions started
in 1999, with new people joining vp:
This “‘new blood’ with new ideas . . .
sought to makes changes in the party
work ethic and the custom and tradi-
tion of the vp through short cuts”
(pvpo, 5 July 2004; see also pvpo, 13
March 2004). Others saw the tensions
as arising from the old guard being
unwilling to pass on the power that
they have held for so long.
Following the reshuffle of February
and resignation of Kalpokas, vp sub-
committees on Tanna began to call
for Natapei’s resignation (VDP, 24 Feb
2004). Splits between different sub-
committees in Port Vila also became
apparent (VDP, 3 March 2004). There
was some hope that tension in vp
would ease after a meeting and public
ceremony by Natapei and Kalpokas,
during which they agreed to refer to
court the matter of the election of the
vp executive (VDP, 6 March 2004).
This heralded the start of protracted
legal maneuverings. The first move
was an interim application by the
Kalpokas camp for an injunction to
stop the disputed parties from using
the vp name. The courts rejected this
application, but any hopes for an eas-
ing of tensions through an agreement
to resolve the dispute through legal
rulings were shown to be naive (VDP,
13 March 2004).
Natapei’s position was further
weakened after allegations by Serge
Vohor that some ump members of
parliament had been offered cash to
join the ailing government (VDP, 18
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March 2004). This was soon followed
by claims from five members of adv
that Minister Moana Carcasses had
promised them payment of 1 million
vatu each in return for switching
political alliances (VDP, 26 March
2004). The allegations of bribery
were, unsurprisingly, denied. A month
after these allegations, a new memo-
randum of agreement was signed,
excluding adv from the government.
The signatories were vp, nup, the
Green Party, and Affiliate Greens
(VDP, 20 April 2004).
The allegations of bribery were,
however, overshadowed by the elec-
tion of the new president of the repub-
lic. Father John Bani’s term as presi-
dent ended on 23 March, and in early
April the Electoral College, which
consists of parliament and the chair-
men of local government councils
(Vanuatu Constitution, Article 34),
convened to elect his successor. The
Electoral Commission, which is a
separate body that administers all
official elections in Vanuatu, cleared
thirty-one candidates as eligible to be
appointed president, and voting began
on 8 April. The fighting and factional-
ism within parliament created a stale-
mate after the first round of voting,
with Kalkot Matas Kelekele, the gov-
ernment’s preferred candidate, receiv-
ing 26 votes, and Alfred Massing
Nalo, the preferred candidate of the
opposition, receiving 21 votes (VDP,
9 April 2004). 
After five days the government
chose to join the opposition in order
to ensure stability, and Nalo was
appointed president. It soon came to
light that Nalo was a convicted crimi-
nal and at the time of his election 
was serving a two-year suspended
sentence for aiding and abetting, mis-
appropriation, and receiving property
dishonestly, after money went missing
following sales of cocoa. Nalo was
acting as an agent for the Vanuatu
Commodities Marketing Board at the
time. The conviction would automati-
cally have disqualified Nalo as a can-
didate, but the Electoral Commission,
which is responsible for conducting
background checks, allegedly did not
detect it because the certificate of pre-
vious offences, issued by the police,
had been filled out incorrectly (pvpo,
28 April 2004). Vohor immediately
used Nalo’s appointment as leverage
against Natapei, saying that he should
resign (VDP, 23 April 2004). Former
President Jean-Leye Lenelcau then
blamed the opposition for the situa-
tion (VDP, 24 April 2004). Nalo him-
self did not appear to take any respon-
sibility and refused to step down,
forcing the government to take the
issue to court. In May the Supreme
Court ordered Nalo’s removal from
the presidency, a decision later con-
firmed by the Court of Appeal (Gov-
ernment v Maseng Nalo). In August
Kalkot Matas Kelekele was eventually
elected to the post of president.
Turbulence in parliament continued
after the presidential election debacle.
The first ordinary session of parlia-
ment was set to begin on 10 May, 
but was boycotted by the opposition,
which submitted a motion of no
confidence to the Speaker. At 6 pm
that evening, Natapei convinced the
acting president to dissolve parlia-
ment. The timing of this dissolution
was interesting, as it came immedi-
ately after Nalo was removed from
the presidency and the Speaker of
parliament was appointed as acting
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president. Some people perceived the
dissolution as a misuse of power and
a self-serving attempt by Natapei to
retain power. The motion of no
confidence had been signed by a
majority of members of parliament,
so government could have changed
while parliament remained in place,
and Vanuatu could have avoided the
expense and disruption of an early
election. The Natapei government,
however, claimed that the dissolution
was done in the interests of stability. 
The decision to dissolve parliament
was immediately challenged in court.
The challengers lost in the Supreme
Court on 13 May but appealed the
decision, thereby casting uncertainty
over whether or not Vanuatu was
going to be heading for a general
election. It was not until 28 May that
the Court of Appeal confirmed that
the parliamentary dissolution was
legal (Vohor v Abiut 1; Vohor v 
Abiut 2).
The election date was set for 6
July. Campaigning was, in large part,
overshadowed by the continuing melt-
down of vp. Not long after the May
no-confidence motion was lodged, vp
members who had signed it (including
Titek, Natuman, and Kalpokas) were
expelled from vp. However, the legal-
ity of this action was unclear, opening
up the possibility of more court chal-
lenges (VDP, 15 May 2004). In early
June the vp coordinator announced a
congress, but this announcement was
declared invalid by Natapei on the
grounds that the executive had not
given authority to hold a congress.
This did not deter the Kalpokas
faction from holding this congress.
Indeed, around the time of the con-
gress the Kalpokas faction went back
to court seeking an order declaring
that the case seeking to have the
Natapei-led executive council declared
valid should be struck out on the
grounds of nonappearance of legal
counsel without explanation (VDP,
11 June 2004). At the congress,
Molisa was named the new vp presi-
dent, replacing Natapei, and a motion
was immediately filed in the Supreme
Court to have this appointment
declared invalid (VDP, 12 June 2004).
Around the same time a series of
legal challenges arose concerning who
would be permitted to use the vp
name during electioneering. While the
court ruled that both parties would 
be permitted to use the vp name, ulti-
mately most of the Kalpokas faction
stood under the Vanua K Group
banner (Kalpokas v Ors v Electoral
Commission).
Two hundred and thirty-seven
candidates contested the election. No
major incidents disrupted voting, but
on Tanna a number of ballot boxes
were burned while in transit to Vila
for official counting. The preliminary
counting had already been done, and
there were allegations that the boxes
had been burned due to anger over
vote rigging (VDP, 10 July 2004).
Fifteen people were arrested over 
the incident, including the caretaker
minister of finance, Jimmy Nicklam.
However, new elections were not
held, and results from Tanna were
based, in part, on the preliminary
counts from those ballot boxes. 
Twenty-three people lost their seats
in parliament. The Kalpokas faction
suffered heavily in the election. Kal-
pokas, Molisa, and Titek all failed to
be reelected. Three caretaker ministers
standing under the vp banner also
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lost their seats—Nicklam, John Mor-
rison Willie, and Nicholas Brown.
Another prominent person who lost
out was Roger Abiut, the former
Speaker of parliament. Abiut, in his
role as acting president, had ordered
the dissolution of parliament. The
only major party to gain seats in the
election was nup, which increased its
seats in parliament from 8 to 10. A
number of small parties also gained
seats (VDP, 9 July 2004).
No government was formed for
several weeks, as different potential
prime ministers attempted to form
coalitions. By the end of the month 
it was becoming clear that Vohor had
a majority. In a last-ditch attempt to
buy enough time to rally support, the
Natapei faction boycotted the parlia-
mentary session scheduled for 26 July.
Parliament eventually sat on 29 July,
and Vohor (ump) became the new
prime minister. His deputy was Kor-
man (vrp), and his cabinet included
Natuman, Barak Sope, and Carcasses
(VDP, 27 July, 30 July 2004). nup and
part of vp formed the opposition.
However, within two days this
government was in trouble. Back-
benchers who had not gained port-
folios were threatening to cross the
floor, and Arnold Prasad, who had
been made minister for ni-Vanuatu
business, resigned claiming that he
had been promised the position of
minister of agriculture (although he
rejoined the government within two
weeks). On 4 August a proposed no-
confidence motion, which would have
resulted in a government led by nup’s
Ham Lini, was not accepted by the
Speaker on the grounds that Lini had
not made an official appointment to
do so. This was followed by allega-
tions that the Speaker did not attend
the official appointment of 6 August
(VDP, 7 Aug 2004). 
The election of the president of
Vanuatu had been set for 13 August.
Before the election, a motion was filed
in the Supreme Court against the
Speaker’s declaration that the motion
of no confidence had been improper
(VDP, 14 Aug 2004). Then the maneu-
vering began, to avoid the vote of no
confidence. Kalkot Matas Kelekele,
the candidate who was supported by
nup, was quickly elected president
and on 18 August there was a cabinet
reshuffle in order to include nup in
the government. Lini became deputy
prime minister and two other nup
members were also given portfolios.
Prasad was removed from the cabinet,
and Korman soon resigned (VDP, 19
Aug 2004). 
The motion of no confidence
continued to float, however. On 19
August the Supreme Court ruled that
the Speaker must allow parliament to
debate the motion of no confidence.
Lini, who proposed the motion, then
withdrew it. The opposition intended
to go back to court for a ruling on
whether the withdrawal was legal
(VDP, 27 Aug 2004).
Political events then took another
change in direction, with the commit-
tal to trial of Barak Sope. Sope, who
had previously been convicted under
the Penal Code for forgery, then par-
doned by the president, was commit-
ted to trial for the same actions under
a different piece of legislation—the
Leadership Code Act (VDP, 28 Aug
2004). Sope immediately appealed on
the grounds that one cannot be prose-
cuted for the same crime twice, and he
was successful. Sope, acting on behalf
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of the government, then demanded
that two Australian federal police
officers attached to the Australian
High Commission be removed from
Vanuatu by 15 September. Two
AusAID advisors in the State Law
Office were also removed. Australian
interference in Vanuatu politics was
cited as grounds for these actions
(VDP, 4 Sept 2004). Australian Min-
ister for Foreign Affairs Alexander
Downer then indicated that the
removal of the Australian federal
police could affect Australia’s aid
to Vanuatu. The Australian federal
police did leave by the initial dead-
line, but by then there were conflict-
ing reports about whether they could
stay on the condition that their terms
of reference could be worked out
(VDP, 16 Sept 2004). There was a
clear sense that Australian officials
were acting like “bad losers” over
events in Vanuatu after their Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs and Trade
issued a warning to Australian travel-
ers on 16 September to be wary of
civil unrest in Vanuatu. This notice
was reissued on 7 October, despite
total absence of any civil unrest (VDP,
8 Oct 2004).
The saga surrounding Sope carried
on in a small way until the end of the
year. Earlier in the year the Office of
the Ombudsman had reissued the
report detailing Sope’s forgery, which
had led to his criminal conviction.
The reissue of the report was perhaps
the beginning of the events that led to
the attempt to retry Sope under the
Leadership Code Act. Sope applied to
the Supreme Court for a ruling that
this was unconstitutional, on the
grounds that he had already been
convicted, but the Supreme Court
rejected his application. In November
the Court of Appeal ruled that the
reissue of the report was unconstitu-
tional (pvpo, 14 Nov 2004).
Claims of interference by Aus-
tralians in Vanuatu politics got a fur-
ther boost when there was an attempt
to have Vohor arrested at the airport
in relation to charges of contempt of
court. The alleged contempt came
from comments made by Vohor in
parliament on September 1 implying
that the judiciary was acting cor-
ruptly, or that Chief Justice Lunabeck
was a “pikinini blong waet man.” A
committal order for Vohor’s imprison-
ment had been issued on September
11, but this was revised the following
day to a summons to appear before
court. The court hearing was set for
17 September. Following these events
the police commissioner was sus-
pended and the AusAID advisor
attached to the Office of the Public
Prosecutor was asked to leave imme-
diately (VDP, 14 Sept, 15 Sept 2004).
The Supreme Court stayed pro-
ceedings until the Court of Appeal
sitting to decide whether the con-
tempt-of-court ruling was correct. The
Court of Appeal quashed all orders
relating to the contempt ruling (VDP,
25 Sept 2004), and soon afterwards
a Commission of Enquiry into the
Office of the Public Prosecutor was
established to investigate the motives
of the office in attempting to have the
prime minister arrested (VDP, 29 Sept
2004). The Office of the Public Prose-
cutor then suspended all criminal
prosecutions, pending the outcome
of the Commission of Enquiry, effec-
tively undermining Vanuatu’s criminal
justice system (VDP, 19 Oct 2004).
The Commission of Enquiry has been
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hindered by refusals from staff of the
Office of the Public Prosecutor to
attend hearings, and by the end of 
the year had not issued a report (VDP,
13 Nov 2004). 
Once Vohor had overcome the
contempt-of-court charges, his govern-
ment proceeded with plans to change
the constitution. These proposed
changes aimed to increase the term
of parliament to five years, to bar
motions of no confidence for a period
of twenty-four months following a
general election, and to prevent mem-
bers of parliament from crossing the
floor by providing that any mp who
resigns from the political party under
which they were elected shall lose
their seat in parliament (VDP, 15 Oct
2004). After some amendments to the
initial proposal the constitutional
amendment was passed by parlia-
ment. The life of parliament was not
extended, but members who cross the
floor will lose their seats. As well,
there cannot be a vote of no confi-
dence “within 12 months of a general
election following a dissolution . . .
within 12 months of any other gen-
eral election . . . within 12 months of
the formation of any Government . . .
or within 12 months before the end 
of the life of a Parliament” (Constitu-
tion [Fourth Amendment] Act 2004).
However, before the amendment can
come into force it must be supported
by a national referendum, which is
due to be held in mid-2005.
In the two final months of 2004
there was still time for two more
major national political events. First,
Vohor made a trip to Taiwan and
signed an agreement establishing full
diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
This was done without the consent 
of the Council of Ministers and
despite the Vanuatu government’s
official support of the one-China pol-
icy. Vohor apparently saw it as a way
of extracting more money from China
as well as gaining funds from Taiwan
(VDP, 5 Nov, 6 Nov 2004). For fear
that China would pull out of Vanuatu
altogether, the Council of Ministers
unanimously decided to veto Vohor’s
decision to establish diplomatic rela-
tions with Taiwan (VDP, 12 Nov
2004). Australia also expressed con-
cern over the Taiwan affair, saying
that aid would be cut unless Vanuatu
could demonstrate that principles of
good governance were being adhered
to (VDP, 26 Nov 2004).
The Taiwan incident was the final
straw for the Vohor government. By
the end of November a motion of no
confidence had been lodged (VDP, 25
Nov 2004). Vohor tried to argue that
this motion was in contravention of
the Constitution (Fourth Amendment)
Act 2004, but both the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeal ruled
that this act is not in effect until the
national referendum takes place. 
On 11 December Ham Lini was
elected the new prime minister. The
cabinet, with a nup prime minister
and a ppp deputy prime minister
(Sato Kilman), included politicians
from nine different parties (VDP, 14
Dec 2004) and remained in place
until the end of the year.
With all of the political changes
throughout 2004, it seemed very little
was achieved. Few acts were passed,
although the unpopular Debit Tax
Act, which had led to protests the
previous year, was repealed. The
position of ombudsman, which had
been vacated after Hannington Alatoa
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reached the end of his five-year term,
was filled by an acting ombudsman
after a weak field of candidates
applied for the post (VDP, 20 Nov
2004). Leadership of the police
remains uncertain, following the
dismissal of Police Commissioner
Diniro on 24 November (VDP, 27 Nov
2004). It can only be hoped that 2005
will see more stability in parliament.
anita jowitt
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